Verifying release artifacts
Release binaries and container images carry GitHub build attestations. Verify them before deploying, with the GitHub CLI:
# Container image (use the digest you deploy, not a mutable tag)
$ gh attestation verify \
oci://ghcr.io/openstack-experimental/keystone@sha256:<digest> \
--repo openstack-experimental/keystone
# Release archive downloaded from the GitHub release
$ gh attestation verify keystone-<target>.tar.xz \
--repo openstack-experimental/keystone
The command fails if the artifact was not built by this repository’s release
workflows, or if it was modified after the build. Pin the verified digest in
your manifests (image: ghcr.io/openstack-experimental/keystone@sha256:…)
instead of a tag.
The OPA policy bundle (ghcr.io/openstack-experimental/keystone/opa-bundle)
is signed separately with keyless cosign signatures; verify it with
cosign verify against the bundle digest.
SBOM and VEX
Each GitHub release carries a CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM per shipped binary
(keystone_bin.cdx.json, keystone-manage_bin.cdx.json) and the OpenVEX
document keystone.openvex.json. They are attested like the archives:
$ gh attestation verify keystone_bin.cdx.json \
--repo openstack-experimental/keystone
The VEX document states, for each advisory the project has chosen to ignore, whether Keystone is affected and what an operator should do; see VEX statements. The container images additionally carry a BuildKit SPDX SBOM attestation covering the operating-system packages:
$ docker buildx imagetools inspect \
ghcr.io/openstack-experimental/keystone@sha256:<digest> \
--format '{{ json .SBOM }}'
Verifying the OPA policy bundle at load time
The opa-bundle image is signed with keyless cosign by the policy
workflow. The production overlay serves the policies baked into the attested
keystone-opa image. To serve the signed bundle instead, add the
opa-bundle-component to your overlay:
components:
- ../opa-bundle-component
An init container (keystone-bundle-verify) resolves the bundle tag to a
digest, runs cosign verify against this repository’s GitHub Actions
identity, and writes an OPA config pinned to the verified digest. OPA starts
only after that succeeds, so a bad signature leaves the pod in Init:Error.
The verifier image is referenced by digest, and the component ships an
all-zero digest so the pod does not start until you pin it: resolve a
keystone-bundle-verify tag to a digest, check it with
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/openstack-experimental/keystone-bundle-verify@sha256:<digest> --repo openstack-experimental/keystone,
and set digest for the image in your overlay. The image is published for
linux/amd64 and linux/arm64.
The pod needs egress to ghcr.io and the Sigstore endpoints. The standalone
tools/opa_config.yaml ships with an all-zero digest that never resolves: run
tools/verify_and_pin_opa_bundle.sh --repo <owner/repo> --tag <tag> to pin it.
Container image properties
- The image runs as the unprivileged user
keystone(uid and gid65532). Orchestrators should keeprunAsNonRoot: trueand the samefsGroup. - Keystone writes only to paths you mount: configuration and key directories,
the log directory, the admin socket directory, the storage
path, and/tmp. Run it with a read-only root filesystem and all capabilities dropped, as the reference manifests intools/k8s/keystonedo. - The base images are pinned by digest in
DockerfileandDockerfile.opa; Dependabot proposes updates.