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VEX statements

deny.toml silences an advisory only when the project has judged what it means for Keystone. That judgment is recorded as an OpenVEX statement in supply-chain/vex/keystone.openvex.json, which ships with every release (attested, next to the SBOM). tools/check_vex.py runs in the release gate and fails when a deny.toml ignore has no statement, or a statement has an invalid status or no justification.

Current statements

AdvisoryComponentStatusSummary
RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin, rsa)rsa 0.9.10affectedExposed only when an operator opts into RS256 signing; the default is ES256. No patched release exists.
RUSTSEC-2026-0387 (crypto-bigint)crypto-bigint 0.5.5affectedReached only through jsonwebtoken’s rust_crypto backend (p256/ecdsa 0.13), which signs the default ES256 tokens. The operations the advisory names run on secret scalars. Remote exploitation is judged impractical; residual risk accepted until jsonwebtoken moves to a patched p256.

rsa review (RUSTSEC-2023-0071)

  • Private-key operations happen only when Keystone signs with RSA: key-repository/src/asymmetric/jwt_bridge.rs loads the key for jsonwebtoken, which signs RS256 through the rsa crate. That is reached by the OAuth2 per-domain signing keys when signing_algorithm = RS256 (default ES256, ADR 0026 §3) and by the JWS token driver with an RS256 key (TOK-2).
  • Public-key operations (RS256 DPoP proof verification in core/src/oauth2_client/dpop.rs, federation JWKS, JWKS publication in oauth2_key/jwks.rs) do not use the private exponent and are not exposed.
  • Signing is a server-side operation on server-built payloads, and the timing of token issuance is only observable through the issuing endpoint. The advisory’s own workaround is to avoid rsa where an attacker can observe timing, so the operator guidance is to keep ES256.

crypto-bigint review (RUSTSEC-2026-0387)

The advisory covers crypto-bigint before 0.7.6: subtraction, zero counting, division, Montgomery multiplication and some equality checks can branch on secret values, depending on compiler and target CPU.

  • Where 0.5.5 comes from. Only elliptic-curve 0.13, reached through p256 0.13, p384 0.13 and ecdsa 0.16, which jsonwebtoken pulls in with its rust_crypto backend. rsa 0.9 does not use crypto-bigint: it does its big-number arithmetic with num-bigint-dig, so this advisory does not touch RS256 (that is RUSTSEC-2023-0071 above).
  • Keystone’s own code is on the patched line. The workspace depends on p256 0.14, which uses crypto-bigint 0.7. ES256 key generation (key-repository/src/asymmetric/keygen.rs) and the JWKS and verifying-key paths in jwt_bridge.rs and oauth2_key/jwks.rs therefore run on patched code.
  • Exposed operation: ES256 signing. jsonwebtoken 11.1 signs ES256 with p256 0.13 SigningKey. The p256 0.13 scalar code calls the affected crypto-bigint 0.5.5 operations on secret values (sub_mod, mul_wide, wrapping_sub) while forming s = k^-1 (z + r d). Keystone signs ES256 tokens in the JWS token driver (TOK-2) and with the OAuth2 per-domain signing keys (the default algorithm). Whether the compiled code branches on secret data depends on compiler and CPU; we have not verified that for the release binaries and do not claim they are safe.
  • Not exposed. p384 0.13 is used only to verify ES384 signatures (DPoP proofs, upstream OIDC tokens); public values only. Keystone never generates P-384 keys. Verification everywhere uses public keys.
  • Why exploitation is judged impractical remotely. An attacker needs to measure the timing of individual ECDSA signing operations (nanosecond to microsecond differences) through the token endpoints, across network and scheduler noise, and then run a lattice attack on partially recovered nonces. Signing nonces are derived deterministically (RFC 6979) from the key and message, so the attacker cannot choose them. A co-located or microarchitectural observer (shared host, shared cache) is a stronger threat. That is a risk we accept, not one we have ruled out.
  • Mitigations available to operators. Run Keystone on dedicated hosts or nodes where it does not share a CPU with untrusted workloads; rotate the signing keys on the normal schedule (the OAuth2 and JWS key rotation limits the amount of signing data per key).
  • How we close it. Move off p256 0.13 when jsonwebtoken releases on p256 0.14 (11.1.0 is the latest release), or switch jsonwebtoken to its aws_lc_rs backend, which does not use p256, ecdsa or rsa at all. The second option changes the crypto provider, so it needs the FIPS and crypto-inventory review first. The deny.toml ignore stays until then.

Removed statements

The three zip advisories (RUSTSEC-2026-0367/0368/0369) no longer apply: zip is a build-dependency of utoipa-swagger-ui only and the lockfile pins 9.0.5, which contains the fix. Their deny.toml ignores were removed.

Changing a statement

  1. Edit supply-chain/vex/keystone.openvex.json (status, justification or action statement) in the same change as the deny.toml edit.
  2. Run python3 tools/check_vex.py.
  3. A not_affected statement needs a justification or impact_statement; an affected statement needs an action_statement.