VEX statements
deny.toml silences an advisory only when the project has judged what it
means for Keystone. That judgment is recorded as an
OpenVEX statement in
supply-chain/vex/keystone.openvex.json, which ships with every release
(attested, next to the SBOM). tools/check_vex.py runs in the
release gate and fails when a deny.toml
ignore has no statement, or a statement has an invalid status or no
justification.
Current statements
| Advisory | Component | Status | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin, rsa) | rsa 0.9.10 | affected | Exposed only when an operator opts into RS256 signing; the default is ES256. No patched release exists. |
RUSTSEC-2026-0387 (crypto-bigint) | crypto-bigint 0.5.5 | affected | Reached only through jsonwebtoken’s rust_crypto backend (p256/ecdsa 0.13), which signs the default ES256 tokens. The operations the advisory names run on secret scalars. Remote exploitation is judged impractical; residual risk accepted until jsonwebtoken moves to a patched p256. |
rsa review (RUSTSEC-2023-0071)
- Private-key operations happen only when Keystone signs with RSA:
key-repository/src/asymmetric/jwt_bridge.rsloads the key forjsonwebtoken, which signs RS256 through thersacrate. That is reached by the OAuth2 per-domain signing keys whensigning_algorithm = RS256(defaultES256, ADR 0026 §3) and by the JWS token driver with an RS256 key (TOK-2). - Public-key operations (RS256 DPoP proof verification in
core/src/oauth2_client/dpop.rs, federation JWKS, JWKS publication inoauth2_key/jwks.rs) do not use the private exponent and are not exposed. - Signing is a server-side operation on server-built payloads, and the
timing of token issuance is only observable through the issuing endpoint.
The advisory’s own workaround is to avoid
rsawhere an attacker can observe timing, so the operator guidance is to keep ES256.
crypto-bigint review (RUSTSEC-2026-0387)
The advisory covers crypto-bigint before 0.7.6: subtraction, zero counting,
division, Montgomery multiplication and some equality checks can branch on
secret values, depending on compiler and target CPU.
- Where 0.5.5 comes from. Only
elliptic-curve0.13, reached throughp2560.13,p3840.13 andecdsa0.16, whichjsonwebtokenpulls in with itsrust_cryptobackend.rsa0.9 does not usecrypto-bigint: it does its big-number arithmetic withnum-bigint-dig, so this advisory does not touch RS256 (that is RUSTSEC-2023-0071 above). - Keystone’s own code is on the patched line. The workspace depends on
p2560.14, which usescrypto-bigint0.7. ES256 key generation (key-repository/src/asymmetric/keygen.rs) and the JWKS and verifying-key paths injwt_bridge.rsandoauth2_key/jwks.rstherefore run on patched code. - Exposed operation: ES256 signing.
jsonwebtoken11.1 signs ES256 withp2560.13SigningKey. Thep2560.13 scalar code calls the affectedcrypto-bigint0.5.5 operations on secret values (sub_mod,mul_wide,wrapping_sub) while formings = k^-1 (z + r d). Keystone signs ES256 tokens in the JWS token driver (TOK-2) and with the OAuth2 per-domain signing keys (the default algorithm). Whether the compiled code branches on secret data depends on compiler and CPU; we have not verified that for the release binaries and do not claim they are safe. - Not exposed.
p3840.13 is used only to verify ES384 signatures (DPoP proofs, upstream OIDC tokens); public values only. Keystone never generates P-384 keys. Verification everywhere uses public keys. - Why exploitation is judged impractical remotely. An attacker needs to measure the timing of individual ECDSA signing operations (nanosecond to microsecond differences) through the token endpoints, across network and scheduler noise, and then run a lattice attack on partially recovered nonces. Signing nonces are derived deterministically (RFC 6979) from the key and message, so the attacker cannot choose them. A co-located or microarchitectural observer (shared host, shared cache) is a stronger threat. That is a risk we accept, not one we have ruled out.
- Mitigations available to operators. Run Keystone on dedicated hosts or nodes where it does not share a CPU with untrusted workloads; rotate the signing keys on the normal schedule (the OAuth2 and JWS key rotation limits the amount of signing data per key).
- How we close it. Move off
p2560.13 whenjsonwebtokenreleases onp2560.14 (11.1.0 is the latest release), or switchjsonwebtokento itsaws_lc_rsbackend, which does not usep256,ecdsaorrsaat all. The second option changes the crypto provider, so it needs the FIPS and crypto-inventory review first. Thedeny.tomlignore stays until then.
Removed statements
The three zip advisories (RUSTSEC-2026-0367/0368/0369) no longer apply:
zip is a build-dependency of utoipa-swagger-ui only and the lockfile pins
9.0.5, which contains the fix. Their deny.toml ignores were removed.
Changing a statement
- Edit
supply-chain/vex/keystone.openvex.json(status, justification or action statement) in the same change as thedeny.tomledit. - Run
python3 tools/check_vex.py. - A
not_affectedstatement needs ajustificationorimpact_statement; anaffectedstatement needs anaction_statement.