Cyber Resilience Act requirements
This page derives what the EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) asks of Keystone and compares how the Python implementation and this Rust implementation currently answer it. It is an engineering gap analysis, not legal advice, and it is not a conformity claim.
How to read the evidence:
- Rust statements are verified against this repository and cite a file.
- Python statements describe upstream OpenStack Keystone from general knowledge of that project. They are not verified in this repository and must be re-checked against the release being compared before they are quoted in any compliance document. Rows where this matters are marked (unverified).
Related pages: Security model, Security architecture review, Crypto inventory, Python API compatibility.
1. Applicability
Timeline
| Date | What applies |
|---|---|
| 10 Dec 2024 | Regulation in force |
| 11 Sep 2026 | Reporting duties of Art. 14 (actively exploited vulnerabilities, severe incidents) |
| 11 Dec 2027 | All remaining obligations (Annex I, Art. 13, conformity assessment, CE marking) |
The 10 Dec 2024 and 11 Sep 2026 dates have already passed. Reporting duties therefore bind a manufacturer today for products placed on the market, including products placed before 11 Dec 2027.
Who is the “manufacturer”
The CRA binds economic operators that make a product with digital elements available in the course of a commercial activity. The role decides the workload, and it is not the same for the two implementations:
| Actor | Role | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Distribution vendors and service providers that ship or sell a Keystone build | Manufacturer (Art. 13) | Full Annex I, II, VII duties, CE marking. They inherit upstream gaps and must close them. |
| The upstream project, if no commercial activity | Out of scope (recital 18), or open-source software steward (Art. 3(14), Art. 24) | Light regime: a documented cybersecurity policy, cooperation with market surveillance, and vulnerability reporting. |
| Operators running Keystone as a service for their own cloud | Not the CRA manufacturer, but covered by NIS2 if essential/important (see NIS2 requirements) | Need the manufacturer’s evidence (SBOM, advisories, support period). |
Both implementations are, for a vendor, “software, placed on the market separately”. Whether this repository’s maintainers are a steward or merely a supplier of components is a governance decision (recorded in the cybersecurity policy: steward). The rest of this page assumes a vendor-grade bar, because that is the bar a downstream manufacturer needs the project to meet.
Product class
Keystone is an identity and access management system. Annex III class I lists “identity management systems and privileged access management software”. Treat Keystone as a class I important product until a vendor’s assessor says otherwise. Verify against the Commission’s implementing act on the technical description of the Annex III categories. In class I a manufacturer may use internal control (module A) only if it applies a harmonised standard or an EU cybersecurity certification scheme in full. Otherwise it needs third-party assessment (modules B+C or H). Harmonised standards were still in preparation at the time of writing. Plan for the third-party path. The class is confirmed; the route is the manufacturer’s decision (see the technical file index).
The default (non-important) class does not change the technical requirements below; it changes who signs off.
2. Annex I Part I — product security requirements
Status legend: Met, Partial, Gap, N/A, Operator (depends on deployment).
Part I(1) — risk-based design
| Requirement | Rust | Python (unverified) |
|---|---|---|
| Design, develop and produce on the basis of a cybersecurity risk assessment (Art. 13(2)–(3), Annex VII) | Partial. Rich threat analysis exists (security-review.md vectors V1–V10, security-model.md invariants I1–I10, ADRs). It is not packaged as the single CRA risk assessment Annex VII requires. | Partial. Threat knowledge lives in the security-guidelines docs and bug history. No product-level CRA risk assessment. |
Part I(2) — properties
| Ref | Requirement | Rust | Python (unverified) | Gap / action |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (a) | No known exploitable vulnerabilities when placed on the market | Partial. audit.yml runs cargo deny and cargo vet weekly and on Cargo.* changes; release-gate.yml runs cargo deny check advisories sources and blocks a tag release on failure. Each deny.toml ignore (RUSTSEC-2023-0071, 2026-0387) has an OpenVEX statement (VEX statements), shipped with each release. Both are assessed affected with residual risk accepted: rsa RS256 signing is exposed only when an operator opts into RS256, and crypto-bigint 0.5.5 stays behind jsonwebtoken’s ES256 signing until jsonwebtoken moves to a patched p256. Remote exploitation is judged impractical but not ruled out. | Partial. Dependencies float within upper-constraints; advisories tracked by the VMT, not by an automated gate per release. | Move off the two affected crates when jsonwebtoken allows it (VEX statements). |
| (b) | Secure-by-default configuration, ability to reset | Partial. insecure_allow_null_key = false default (crates/config/src/credential.rs, fernet_token.rs). OPA is required in production per admin/security.md. The container images run as the unprivileged keystone user (uid/gid 65532); the reference manifests run non-root with a read-only root filesystem and no capabilities. | Partial. Configuration is operator-assembled; insecure_debug and similar opt-ins default off. Policy defaults are shipped in code. | Secure defaults are tabulated in the Security reference. |
| (c) | Security updates, automatic by default with opt-out, separable from feature updates | Gap. Release via release-plz and cargo dist (dist-workspace.toml has install-updater = true, an updater for the CLI installer, not a service update channel). No security-only release line. Pre-1.0 (0.1.x), so fixes ship with features. | Partial. Stable branches receive backports only, which separates security from features by construction. Updates are not automatic (distro packages are). | R5: define a patch-only branch policy; document that “automatic” is satisfied by the downstream package/image channel and say so explicitly. |
| (d) | Protection from unauthorised access (authentication, identity and access management) | Met (strongest area). OPA/Rego on every handler with CI gates A, B1, B2, C, D, E, J (security-review.md §0); delegation invariants I1–I10; rate limiting (ADR 0022); failed-auth lockout, inactive account and password expiry (ADR 0010–0012); passkeys, mTLS/SPIFFE admin socket. | Met. oslo.policy rules, security_compliance lockout/expiry, MFA (TOTP), federation. Fewer automated checks that policy and handler agree. | None open (system_scope dead key fixed in #1048). |
| (e) | Confidentiality: encryption of data at rest and in transit | Partial. Raft log/state/backup are AES-256-GCM under a KEK (PKCS#11, TPM or env) (crypto-inventory.md STO-1…8). Tokens and credential blobs are Fernet (TOK-1). TLS via rustls; TLS to the database via system OpenSSL (NET-3). Public TLS is expected at a proxy (admin/security.md). The SQL backends store identity data in the database as-is. | Partial. Fernet for tokens, credential encryption via Fernet keys. TLS to clients through WSGI front-end; DB encryption is the operator’s. | Coverage is stated in the Security reference. |
| (f) | Integrity: protect against unauthorised modification of data and configuration | Met/Partial. HMAC-signed, canonicalised audit events (AUD-1…3). Release artefacts carry GitHub attestations (release.yml, container-publish.yml). OPA bundle is cosign-signed (policy-container.yml); the optional opa-bundle-component verifies and pins it in an init container before OPA starts, and tools/opa_config.yaml no longer defaults to :latest. The production overlay still serves the policies baked into the attested keystone-opa image. | Partial. Signed release tags and tarballs (unverified); no runtime integrity check on policy files. | None. |
| (g) | Data minimisation | Partial. Secrets stripped from policy input, audit and error strings (I7, Gates I). Audit PII handling discussed in ADR 0023 “Security Compliance vs. PII Requirements”. | Partial. Notifications and audit middleware may carry user identifiers; no formal minimisation review. | The data inventory is in the Security reference. |
| (h) | Availability and resilience, DoS mitigation | Partial. Rate limiting on all unauthenticated crypto endpoints (V6 closed; coverage matrix in ADR 0022 addendum); Raft replication; health/readiness (admin/operations.md); fuzzing of parsers. | Gap/Operator. No in-process rate limiting; relies on a proxy. | Rate-limit defaults are documented in the Security reference. |
| (i) | Limit impact on other services’ availability | Partial. Per-request cache (ADR 0030) and pagination (ADR 0029) bound downstream load. LDAP and OPA are external dependencies with failure modes not summarised in one place. | Partial. Pagination limit via list_limit; caching via dogpile.cache. | Failure semantics are in the Security reference. |
| (j) | Limit attack surface, including external interfaces | Partial. Plain HTTP listener, admin Unix socket, Raft gRPC and metrics are separate listeners (admin/security.md). WASM auth plugins add a pre-auth surface (V7), bounded by a capability list and SHA-256 artefact pinning (TOK-10). unsafe_code = "forbid" workspace-wide (Cargo.toml). | Partial. Single WSGI app with many extension points loaded by stevedore; large dependency tree. | Listeners are tabulated in the Security reference. |
| (k) | Exploitation mitigations | Met/Partial. Memory-safe language; unwrap/expect/print_stdout denied by lint; fuzzing (5 targets), mutation testing on auth/policy modules, property tests (Gate F, G). Build hardening of release binaries is documented in the Security reference. | Met. Memory-safe runtime for Keystone itself; native extensions (cryptography, DB drivers) are not. No fuzzing. | Build profile and hardening are recorded in the Security reference. |
| (l) | Security logging and monitoring, user opt-out | Met. Native CADF audit with HMAC chain, spool and syslog sink (ADR 0023, admin/features/audit.md); OpenTelemetry and Prometheus (ADRs 0031, 0040). | Partial. oslo.log plus the pyCADF audit middleware and notifications; tamper evidence is not built in. | Rust is ahead. Document opt-out. |
| (m) | Secure, permanent data removal and transfer | Partial. User deletion cascades to credentials, application credentials, trusts and assignments. Passkeys and OAuth2 sessions are removed or revoked by event hooks. Backups, Raft snapshots and the audit spool keep the data; this is documented. | Not assessed. Deletion is a database operation; backups are the operator’s. | Removal behaviour is in the Security reference. |
A distroless runtime image was considered for (j) and rejected: it has no shell,
which breaks operator access to the admin Unix socket (curl --unix-socket from
inside the pod, whose peer-credential check rules out a differently privileged
debug container) and the shell-based entrypoints in the reference manifests. The
images stay on debian:trixie-slim, digest-pinned.
3. Annex I Part II — vulnerability handling
| Ref | Requirement | Rust | Python (unverified) | Gap / action |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | Identify and document components; SBOM in a machine-readable, commonly used format covering at least top-level dependencies | Partial. Cargo.lock is committed; cargo dist builds with cargo-auditable (dist-workspace.toml), embedding the dependency graph in the binary. A CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM per shipped binary (release-sbom.yml) is attached to each GitHub release and attested; the container images carry a BuildKit SPDX SBOM attestation. | Gap. Requirements are declared (requirements.txt, upper-constraints.txt); no published SBOM. | None. |
| (2) | Address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay; provide security updates | Partial. Dependabot weekly for cargo and Actions (patch updates ignored by config; see R15). cargo deny/cargo vet run in CI. | Met. VMT process with embargoed fixes and OSSAs; backports to maintained stable branches. | R15: stop ignoring semver-patch Dependabot updates for security advisories (security updates bypass ignore, but verify the repo setting). |
| (3) | Regular tests and reviews of security | Met. Weekly audit and fuzz workflows, scheduled mutation testing, a recorded security review with a re-evaluation date. | Partial. Unit/functional tests; static analysis (bandit) in OpenStack gates (unverified); no fuzzing. | Keep the review dated. |
| (4) | Once a fix is available, publicly disclose fixed vulnerabilities (description, severity, affected versions, fix) | Met. The process is documented in SECURITY.md and the cybersecurity policy. GitHub Security Advisories are enabled on the repository, which also gives CVE requests. | Met. OSSA notes and CVE records. | None. |
| (5) | Coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy | Partial. SECURITY.md now states supported versions, response targets (3 d / 7 d), scope of the process and the disclosure steps. No PGP key and no safe-harbour text. | Met. Launchpad private security bugs and the VMT policy. | None. |
| (6) | Facilitate vulnerability information sharing; contact address for reporting | Partial. GitHub private vulnerability reporting is the only channel; no role mailbox. Accepted risk, see cybersecurity policy. | Met. | None; role mailbox accepted as a risk. |
| (7) | Mechanisms to securely distribute updates | Partial. GitHub attestations for release binaries and images; cosign for the policy bundle. Consumer verification steps are in Verifying release artifacts; base images are digest-pinned and kept current by Dependabot. No signed checksum file. | Partial. Signed tarballs and PyPI; distro channels. | None. |
| (8) | Disseminate security updates without delay, free of charge, with advisory messages | Met. Free; advisory text via GHSA and the Security announcements Discussions category. | Met. | None. |
4. Obligations that are not in Annex I
| Obligation | Source | Rust | Python (unverified) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Support period of at least five years, unless the product’s expected use time is shorter | Art. 13(8) | Out of scope for the steward; documented. Upstream gives no support period and patches the latest release only (support policy). The vendor sets and publishes its own. | Partial. Defined maintenance phases per release, typically shorter than five years in total; a vendor must extend it through the distribution. |
| Exercise due diligence on third-party components, report vulnerabilities found in them upstream | Art. 13(5)–(6) | Partial. cargo vet imports audits from Mozilla, Google, Bytecode Alliance and others. deny.toml has unknown-registry = "warn" and unknown-git = "warn". | Partial. upper-constraints curation; limited audit of transitive dependencies. |
| Report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents: early warning in 24 h, notification in 72 h, final report in 14 days (vulnerability) or one month (incident), via the ENISA single reporting platform | Art. 14 | Partial. Runbook and a role-based owner exist; whether the project’s own steward reporting duty applies is to be confirmed by legal review. | Gap. The VMT handles disclosure, not Art. 14 reporting to CSIRT/ENISA; a vendor must add it. |
| Technical documentation: design, risk assessment, SBOM, test reports, EU declaration of conformity | Art. 13(12), Annex VII | Partial. Indexed in the technical file index; the single packaged risk assessment and per-release test reports are still missing. | Gap. |
| User information and instructions: contact point, support end date, secure-use guidance, where to find the SBOM | Art. 13(18), Annex II | Partial. admin/security.md, admin/operations.md. No support end date or SBOM pointer. | Partial. Operator documentation exists; support end date is distro-specific. |
| Conformity assessment, EU declaration, CE marking | Arts. 28–32 | Gap (vendor task). Needs a standard or third-party route (see §1). | Gap (vendor task). |
| Cryptography | Part I(2)(e)(f); Annex VII | Met for documentation. crypto-inventory.md is rare and valuable: algorithm, provider, FIPS status per primitive, enforced by an AGENTS.md rule. Known not-validated primitives are listed (TOK-1…11, PWD-*). | Gap. No equivalent inventory. |
5. Python and Rust compared
| Dimension | Python Keystone (unverified) | This repository | Net for CRA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Memory-safety class of bugs | Eliminated in Python code; present in C extensions | Eliminated in workspace code (unsafe_code = forbid); dependencies may use unsafe | Rust slightly ahead, but not a CRA test |
| Dependency pinning | Version ranges plus upper constraints | Cargo.lock committed, cargo-auditable in release builds | Rust ahead |
| Dependency policy gates | Constraints review | cargo deny (advisories, licences, bans, sources), cargo vet, Dependabot | Rust ahead; fix unknown-* warn levels |
| SBOM | Not published | Embedded in binary, not published | Both need work |
| Release provenance | Signed tags/tarballs | Build attestations, container attestations, cosign for policy | Rust ahead if consumer docs are added |
| Authorization testing | Policy YAML; unit tests | OPA bundle, Rego tests, handler↔policy contract checks, mutation and property tests | Rust ahead |
| Fuzzing | None known | Five targets, weekly | Rust ahead |
| Audit trail | pyCADF middleware, oslo.log | Native CADF, HMAC-signed, spool, syslog | Rust ahead |
| Cryptographic documentation | Not centralised | Full inventory with FIPS status | Rust ahead |
| FIPS posture | Depends on host OpenSSL | AWS-LC fips build for storage, audit and TLS; many primitives still not validated (Fernet, JWS, password hashes) | Rust has a path; neither is fully validated |
| Vulnerability disclosure | Mature, public, with advisories and CVEs | GitHub private reporting, advisories and a documented process | Python ahead |
| Support policy | Defined stable branches and EOL | None (0.1.x) | Python ahead |
| Compatibility surface | Complete v3 API | Subset of v3 plus v4 (python-compatibility.md) | Rust must keep the Python gap list current: missing endpoints are a functional, not CRA, gap |
| Interop obligations | n/a | Fernet, bcrypt, scrypt, AWS SigV2 and TOTP-SHA1 are Compat-fixed | Weak primitives are inherited; document the rationale as risk acceptance |
| Container hardening | Reference image is test-only (tools/Dockerfile.py-keystone) | Image runs as root by default | Gap in both; fix Rust image |
Key point for a mixed deployment: the CRA applies per product. When both services run side by side behind one proxy (see installation), each needs its own SBOM, advisory feed and support period, and the shared Fernet and credential keys are in the scope of both risk assessments.
6. Work items
Priorities: P0 blocks any downstream manufacturer today (reporting duties apply since 11 Sep 2026); P1 needed before 11 Dec 2027; P2 hardening.
No open work items. The project-side gaps found in this analysis are closed or recorded as accepted risks in the cybersecurity policy, VEX statements and support policy. Remaining duties belong to the manufacturer; see the technical file index.
7. Maintaining this page
- Re-check the Python column against the exact upstream release being compared whenever this page is cited externally.
- When
deny.tomlgains an advisory ignore, add the matching statement tosupply-chain/vex/keystone.openvex.jsonin the same change;release-gate.ymlfails the release otherwise. - When a work item lands, change its row here and, if it affects cryptography, the crypto inventory in the same change.
- Re-verify the legal dates and the Annex III implementing act before use; they are stated here but not yet verified against the Official Journal text.